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We use a panel of Brazilian exporters, their products, and destination markets to document a set of
regularities for multi-product exporters: (i) few top-selling products account for the bulk of a firm's
exports in a market, (ii) the distribution of exporter scope (the number of products per firm in a market)
is similar across markets, and (iii) within each market, exporter scope is positively associated with
average sales per product. Our data also show that firms systematically export their highest-sales products
across multiple destinations. To account for these regularities, we develop a model of firm-product
heterogeneity with entry costs that depend on exporter scope. Estimating this model for the within-firm
sales distribution we identify the nature and components of product entry costs. We find that firms
face a strong decline in product sales with scope but also that market-specific entry costs drop fast.
Counterfactual experiments with globally falling entry costs indicate that a large share of the simulated
increase in trade is attributable to declines in the firm's entry cost for the first product.
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Market-speciﬁc entry costs are an important ingredient in recent trade theory. Combined with ﬁrm
heterogeneity, entry costs serve as a key explanation for exporter behavior and the size distribution
of ﬁrms.1 After rounds of tariff reductions and drops in transport costs, local entry costs from
technicalbarrierstotradeandregulatoryprotectionarethoughttobemajorremainingimpediments
to trade (Baldwin 2000, Maskus and Wilson 2001).2 Micro-econometric estimates suggest that
ﬁrm entry costs are a substantive fraction of export sales (Das, Roberts, and Tybout 2007, Maskus,
Otsuki, and Wilson 2005). Market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs do not only limit ﬁrm entry, they also hinder
the expansion of proliﬁc multi-product exporters.
To study the nature and components of entry costs, we use comprehensive data on multi-
product ﬁrms and their destinations. Beyond the extensive margin of ﬁrm presence, we decom-
pose, destination by destination, an exporter’s sales into the extensive margin of the number of
products—the exporter scope—and the remaining intensive margin of the exporter’s average sales
per product, which we call exporter scale. We use a structural approach to quantify the relevance
of multi-product exporters in a general-equilibrium framework for the ﬁrst time. To do so, we
separately identify sources of within-ﬁrm heterogeneity in product sales and economies of scope
in local product entry costs. Based on our estimates, we assess the general-equilibrium effects of
reduced market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs on the expansion of incumbent multi-product exporters and
new exporters. Our simulations suggest that new products of incumbent exporters contribute less
to bilateral trade than new exporters.
A number of key regularities emerge from our Brazilian exporter data and discipline the anal-
ysis.3 First, a few top-selling products explain the bulk of a ﬁrm’s exports in a market, whereas
wide-scope exporters sell their lowest-selling products in minor amounts.4 Second, within des-
1See for example Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010).
2The World Bank estimates in its Global Economic Prospects 2004 report that trade facilitation would increase
world trade by approximately $377 billion overall, to which an improvement in the regulatory environment would
contribute $83 billion and services sector infrastructure and e-business usage another $154 billion (World Bank 2003).
The World Trade Organization’s World Trade Report 2008 asserts that “with respect to product standards, technical
regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, considerable opportunities exist for reducing trade costs”
(WTO 2008, p. 149).
3To assess robustness for another country, we use panel data of Chilean exporters in 2000 (see ´ Alvarez, Faruq,
and L´ opez 2007). We ﬁnd the regularities conﬁrmed and estimates to be similar, and report them in our online Data
Appendix.
4Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a) document a similar pattern for worldwide shipments by U.S. ﬁrms. We
show that the pattern is repeated market by market.
1tinations, there are few wide-scope and large-sales ﬁrms but many narrow-scope and small-sales
ﬁrms. Third, within destinations, mean exporter scope and mean exporter scale are positively as-
sociated. These three regularities occur repeatedly destination by destination. Comparing across
destinations but within ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that exporters are likely to sell their highly successful prod-
ucts in many destinations and in large amounts. We interpret this body of regularities as evidence
of heterogeneity in product efﬁciency, or consumer appeal, and as evidence of entry costs that vary
by product and destination.
Guided by these facts, we propose a model of ﬁrm-product heterogeneity where ﬁrms face
destination-speciﬁc entry costs for each of their products. The model rests on a single source of
ﬁrm heterogeneity (productivity) and ﬁrms face declining efﬁciency in supplying their less suc-
cessful products, similar to Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2009).5
Our speciﬁcation of local entry costs accommodates the cases of both economies or diseconomies
of scope.6 The setup offers a tractable extension of the Melitz (2003) framework to multiple prod-
ucts where the ﬁrm decides along three export margins: its presence at export destinations, its
exporter scope at a destination, and its individual product sales at the destination.
We use our model’s structural implications to obtain novel estimates for parameters that govern
separate entry cost components, ﬁtting the within-ﬁrm heterogeneity under the ﬁrst regularity.
We check the ﬁtted model’s prediction for the remaining two regularities across ﬁrms and show
that the model approximates well the scope and sales distributions and generates the observed
positive association between exporter scope and exporter scale. Estimates point to a strong decline
in product efﬁciency with scope. So only highly productive ﬁrms choose a wide scope. But
local entry costs exhibit economies of scope for the introduction of additional products within
a market, consistent with the fact that wide-scope exporters sell their lowest-selling products in
minor amounts.
Having parameterized the model, we simulate a 25-percent reduction in entry costs and their
effect on global trade. We distinguish between a decline in ﬁrm entry costs for the ﬁrst product
and a decline in entry costs that a multi-product exporter incurs for additional export products. We
5Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a) develop a multi-product ﬁrm model with products that have idiosyncratic
country-speciﬁc demand shocks. Departing from CES demand, Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2010) study
the ﬁrm’s investment in product appeal. Exporter scope is socially optimal in these models. Thomas (2010) proposes
an agency approach to product adoption and documents inefﬁcient variation in ﬁrm scope for detergent manufacturers
across local markets in Western Europe.
6SeminalreferencesoneconomiesofscopearePanzarandWillig(1977)and(1981). Formally, thereareeconomies
of scope if the cost function satisﬁes C(x + y) < C(x) + C(y) (if the cost function is subadditive).
2ﬁnd that most of the simulated trade increase is due to falling entry costs for the ﬁrst product—
such as one-shot startup costs for information acquisition, the setup of certiﬁed and accredited
testing facilities, investments in technology acquisition for export development, and perhaps brand
marketing costs. In contrast, trade is less sensitive to falling entry costs for subsequent products—
such as compliance with an individual product’s technical requirements, mandatory or voluntary
product safety standards, and packaging and labelling procedures, or expenditures for extending
marketing and the distribution network to additional products.
Overall, a simulated 25-percent reduction in entry costs only results in a less than 1-percent
welfare increase. Firm entry costs are typically found to inﬂuence sales little because only small
exporters around the entry threshold respond (Das, Roberts, and Tybout 2007, di Giovanni and
Levchenko 2010). But incumbent exporters add products when entry costs fall, suggesting poten-
tially salient changes to trade ﬂows because multi-product exporters dominate trade. Our simula-
tions show, however, that the elasticity of trade with respect to product entry costs is even smaller
than with respect to ﬁrm entry costs. The reason for the surprisingly small contribution of the
extensive margin of adding products is the estimated combination of strongly declining product
efﬁciencies and economies of scope in local entry, so that even highly productive wide-scope ex-
porters add only products that sell minor amounts. We conﬁrm the small response at the extensive
margin of exporting products also for a simulated 25-percent drop in variable trade costs.
Our analysis is related to an emerging literature that documents the dominance of multi-product
ﬁrms in the economy and multi-product exporters in international trade (Bernard, Redding, and
Schott 2010b, Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2010).7 Beyond existing evidence,
we show systematic and recurrent exporter behavior market by market and the correlation of prod-
uct sales within ﬁrms across markets.
For our model, we use a conventional demand system with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) and embed the Eckel and Neary (2010) production setup, by which ﬁrms can take up addi-
tional products (away from their core competency) only at lower marginal efﬁciency. This setup
implies that a ﬁrm’s product sales are perfectly correlated across the markets where a product is
sold, which reﬂects features of our data but also distinguishes our approach from the stochastic
7Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) show for U.S. trade data in 2000, for instance, that ﬁrms that export more than
ﬁve products at the HS 10-digit level make up 30 percent of exporting ﬁrms but account for 97 percent of all exports.
In our Brazilian exporter data for 2000, 25 percent of all manufacturing exporters ship more than ten products at the
internationally comparable HS 6-digit level and account for 75 percent of total exports. Similar ﬁndings are shared by
Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) for Mexico and ´ Alvarez, Faruq, and L´ opez (2007) for Chile.
3ﬁrm-product model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010b and 2010a).8 Mayer, Melitz, and Ot-
taviano (2009) analyze additional properties of the within-ﬁrm sales distribution through country-
pair comparisons and explain them with an Eckel and Neary (2010) production setup under a
varying demand elasticity.9
While intentionally parsimonious, our model is qualitatively consistent with the empirical reg-
ularities under a set of mild and empirically conﬁrmed restrictions on product efﬁciency and entry
costs. Moreover, underthecommonassumptionofParetodistributedﬁrmproductivities, themodel
preserves desirable predictions of previous trade theory: at the ﬁrm level the model generates a to-
tal sales distribution that is Pareto-shaped in the upper tail as in Chaney (2008), and at the country
level it results in a general equilibrium gravity relationship resembling the one in Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009) show for a wide family of models, which
includes ours, that conditional on identical observed trade ﬂows these models predict identical
ex-post welfare gains irrespective of ﬁrm turnover and product-market reallocation. Their ﬁnd-
ings also imply, however, that models in that family differ in their predictions for trade ﬂows and
welfare with respect to ex-ante changes in entry costs. Our model provides market-speciﬁc micro-
foundations for these entry costs. The model’s tractable setup can be used to compute the impact
of rich policy experiments on trade ﬂows and welfare.
The organization of this paper is in six more sections. In Section 2 we describe the data and
present key regularities. We introduce the general model in Section 3 and show how it generates
the regularities. In Section 4 we derive equilibrium and bilateral trade under a Pareto distribution
and adopt parametric functional forms for estimation. We obtain structural estimates of entry cost
parameters in Section 5, and simulate their cross sectional predictions. Section 6 applies these
estimates to simulate a drop in entry costs. Section 7 concludes.
8Incomplete correlation can readily be built into our model, using random sales shocks per product as developed
by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010). The benchmark speciﬁcation in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010b)
makes product heterogeneity market speciﬁc so that product sales are uncorrelated across markets. For product sales
covariation to be built into their model, a correlated distribution of product efﬁciencies would need to be speciﬁed.
9Feenstra and Ma (2008), Nocke and Yeaple (2006) and Dhingra (2010) study multi-product exporters but do not
generate a within-ﬁrm sales distribution, which lies at the heart of our analysis.
42 Data
Our Brazilian exporter data derive from the universe of customs declarations for merchandize
exports during the year 2000 by any ﬁrm. From these customs records, we construct a three-
dimensional panel of exporters, their respective destination countries, and their export products at
the Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit level. We brieﬂy discuss the data sources and characteristics,
and then present three main stylized facts that emerge from the data.
2.1 Data sources and sample characteristics
In our pristine exports data from SECEX (Secretaria de Com´ ercio Exterior), product codes are
8-digit numbers (under the common Mercosur nomenclature), of which the ﬁrst six digits coincide
with the ﬁrst six HS digits. We aggregate the monthly exports data to the HS 6-digit product, ﬁrm
and year level. To relate our data to product-market information for destination countries and their
sectors, we map the HS 6-digit codes to ISIC revision 2 at the two-digit level and link our data
to World Trade Flow (WTF) data for the year 2000 (Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo 2005).
In 2000, our SECEX data for manufactured merchandize sold by Brazilian ﬁrms from any sector
(including commercial intermediaries) reaches a coverage of 95.9 percent of Brazilian exports in
WTF.
We restrict our sample to manufacturing ﬁrms and their exports of manufacturing products,
removing intermediaries and their commercial resales of manufactures. The restriction to manu-
facturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products makes our ﬁndings closely comparable to Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a), for example. The group
of manufacturing ﬁrms covers a substantial fraction of exports (81.7 percent of the WTF manu-
factures exports).10 The resulting manufacturing ﬁrm sample has 10,215 exporters shipping 3,717
manufacturing products at the 6-digit HS level to 170 foreign destinations, and a total of 162,570
exporter-destination-product observations. Multi-product exporters sell more than 90 percent of
all exports from Brazil.
10Exporter behavior in Brazil is strikingly similar to that in leading export countries such as France and the United
States (see our online Data Appendix). Appendix D.1 reports summary statistics and documents the dominance of
multi-product exporters in total exports. In our online Data Appendix we also report ﬁndings from the complementary
group of commercial intermediary ﬁrms and their exports of manufactures.
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Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: Products at the HS 6-digit level. World average in right-hand graph from pooling destinations where ﬁrms in a
given exporter-scope group ship.
Figure 1: Within-ﬁrm Sales Distribution
2.2 Three regularities
To describe the extensive margin of exporting products, we look at the number of products that a
ﬁrm sells at each destination. We decompose a ﬁrm ω’s total exports to destination d, td(ω), into
the number of products Gd(ω) sold at d (the exporter scope in d) and the average sales per export
product ad(ω) ≡ td(ω)/Gd(ω) in d (the exporter scale in d). We elicit three major stylized facts
from the data at three levels of aggregation, moving from less to more aggregation.
Fact 1 Within ﬁrms and destinations, exports are concentrated in few top-selling products. Wide-
scope exporters sell small amounts of their lowest-selling products.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of sales of ﬁrms for different products within the ﬁrm.11 We
consider ﬁrms with the same number of products and rank the products of each ﬁrm from top-
selling (rank 1) to lowest-selling at a given destination. We then take the average across ﬁrms of
each product at a given product rank and plot the logarithm of this value against the logarithm of
the rank of the product. The ﬁgure depicts the results for manufacturers that sell exactly 4, 8, 16
or 32 products to Brazil’s top export destination in 2000, the United States, or worldwide over all
destinations. The worldwide ﬁgures here treat the rest of the world as if it were a single destination
(individual plots are similar destination by destination). The elasticity of individual product sales
11Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a) present evidence for U.S. ﬁrms’ sales worldwide comparable to the right-
hand side graph in Figure 1. Our analysis shifts attention to regularities by destination.
6with respect to the rank of the product is about -2.8 in the United States and -2.6 worldwide
implying that sales fall sharply with rank. As expected, the contribution of the top-selling products
in the total sales of ﬁrms is large: for ﬁrms with 32 products in the USA or Argentina, the top
3 products account, on average, for more than 85 percent of their total sales. This number is 76
percent for the world as one destination.
For shipments to the United States in Figure 1, the top-selling product (rank 1) sells on average
US$ 38 million at 32-product ﬁrms but only US$ 2.2 million at 4-product ﬁrms.12 On average, the
top-sellingproductofmulti-productexportersaccountsfor70percentoftheirsalestoadestination.
For the lowest-selling product, in contrast, narrower-scope ﬁrms have far higher average sales per
product than wide-scope exporters. The lowest-selling product of 32-products exporters to the
United States, for instance, sells for merely US$ 12 in 2000 (rank 32) and 16-products exporters
ship just US$ 77 of their lowest-selling product (rank 16). In contrast, the lowest-selling product
of 8 and 4-products exporters (rank 8 and rank 4) sells for US$ 5,400 and US$ 67,000 respectively.
Thus, the ﬁndings in Figure 1 suggest that wide-scope exporters have higher sales for their ﬁrst
product than narrow-scope ﬁrms. At the same time, wide-scope exporters tolerate lower sales for
their lowest-selling products than narrow-scope ﬁrms.13
Fact 2 Within destinations, there are few wide-scope and large-sales ﬁrms but many narrow-scope
and small-sales ﬁrms.
To graph the exporter scope distribution, we rank ﬁrms according to their exporter scopes in a
destination market. The upper panel of Figure 2 plots exporter scope against the scope percentiles
for Brazil’s top two exporting markets, the United States and Argentina. These plots too are sim-
ilar for most Brazilian destinations. For instance, the median Brazilian exporter sells one or two
products per destination and the mean number of products is around three to four products in in-
dividual destinations (see also Table D.1 in the Appendix). Exporter scope is a discrete variable
but the overall shape of the distributions approximately resembles that of a power-law distributed
variable.
12There is considerable small-sample variability within single destinations so that top-product sales may not gener-
ally increase between ﬁrms with increasing scope. In Figure 1 for the United States, for instance, the (four) 16-product
ﬁrms exhibit untypically low top-product sales compared to 8-product ﬁrms, whereas the (nine) 17-product ﬁrms do
exhibit higher top-product sales compared to the (22) 9-product ﬁrms as expected. Destination aggregates do not
exhibit such small-sample variability.
13Beyond Fact 1, Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2009) document that the slope of the graphs in Figure 1 is steeper
in larger destination markets.
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Firm Percentiles in Total Exports from the Top
Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: Products at HS 6-digit level. In the lower panel, the left-most observations are all exporters; at the next percentile
are exporter observations with sales in the top 99 percentiles; up to the right-most observations with exporters whose
sales are in the top percentile.
Figure 2: Exporter Scope and Export Sales Distributions
To graph the export sales distribution, we use cumulative plots in the lower panel of Figure 2. A
cumulative plot naturally relates to later regularities for exporter scope and exporter scale. On the
horizontal axis, we now group ﬁrms at or above a given total exports percentile. At the origin, we
cumulate all ﬁrms and plot mean total sales  tsd. Then we step one percentile to the right along the
horizontal axis and restrict the sample to all those ﬁrms that are in the top 99 percentiles, depicting
mean total sales for that group of ﬁrms. We continue to move up in the total-exports ranking of
ﬁrms and graph mean total sales by percentile group until we reach the top-percentile group of
ﬁrms. Such a cumulative plot puts the emphasis on the mean exporter by percentile group and
weights down deviant behavior of small-scale exporters.14 It is the signature of a power law dis-
14Introducing the marketing cost mechanism of Arkolakis (2010) is a straightforward extension of our model and
would allow us to match the size distribution of smaller ﬁrms as well. For our focus is on the multi-product ﬁrm, we
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Log Firm Percentiles in Total Exports from the Top
Mean Exporter Scope Firms’ Mean Product Scale
Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: World graph is based on pooling all markets. The groups-of-ten graph shows 70 markets (with 100 or more
Brazilian exporters), where markets are ﬁrst ranked by total sales and then lumped to seven groups of ten countries
by total-sales rank. Products at the Harmonized-System 6-digit level. Left-most observations are all exporters; at the
next percentile are exporter observations with sales in the top 99 percentiles; up to the right-most observations with
exporters whose sales are in the top percentile.
Figure 3: Mean Exporter Scale and Mean Exporter Scope
tribution that the log-log relationship in such a cumulative plot is linear. A power-law distribution
implies that less frequent outcomes command a more than proportionate share of the total while the
most frequent outcomes represent only a subordinate fraction. So there are few large-sales ﬁrms
but many small-sales ﬁrms. (Plots of total exports against the total exports percentiles conﬁrm the
inference and resemble ﬁndings in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010).) The plots for sales are
similar across Brazilian destinations. Next we investigate the relationship between exporter scale
and exporter scope.
Fact 3 Within destinations, mean exporter scope and mean exporter scale are positively associ-
ated.
9One might expect from Fact 1 that wide-scope ﬁrms would have low average sales per product
because they adopt more products with minor sales. The opposite is the case. In Figure 3 we plot
ﬁrms’ mean scope and scope-weighted mean exporter scale at a destination against these ﬁrms’
rank in total exports at that destination.15
The means in Figure 3 are computed in the same way as mean exports before and are linear
decompositions of their counterparts in the lower panel of Figure 2, by construction. On the hori-
zontal axis, we group ﬁrms at or above a given total exports percentile. At the origin, we cumulate
all ﬁrms and plot their mean scope  Gsd and the scope-weighted mean exporter scale  asd so that the
product of the two means yields mean total sales  tsd. Then we move upwards in the total-exports
ranking of ﬁrms, percentile by percentile, dropping from the sample all those ﬁrms that are below
the next higher total-exports percentile and depict mean exporter scope and mean average scale for
the higher-ranked group of ﬁrms.
The log mean scope and log mean scale both increase in the ﬁrms’ log percentile. The increases
are close to linear in the two export markets United States and Argentina and, on average, in the
world (treating all destinations as a single market). This log-linear pattern is also visible in groups
of ten similarly ranked destinations (70 destinations with at least 100 Brazilian exporters where
destinations are ﬁrst ranked by total sales and then lumped to seven groups of ten countries).
Overall, Figure 3 strongly suggests that there is a systematically positive relationship between
average exporter scale and exporter scope.
2.3 Product shipments across destinations
Before we turn to a ﬁrm-level model, we investigate whether ﬁrms systematically sell their most
successful products across destinations.16 We present evidence that a ﬁrm’s successful products
in one market are also its leading products in other markets, and that a ﬁrm’s successful products
reach a larger number of markets. To document systematic sales patterns by product and ﬁrm
across markets, we use the United States as our reference country. The United States is Brazil’s
top export destination in 2000.








g Gd(ω). For unweighted
mean exporter scale, a similar positive association as depicted in Figure 3 arises. We present those ﬁgures and numer-
ous additional results in our online Data Appendix.
16With the critique by Armenter and Koren (2010) and their balls-and-bins model of trade in mind, we pursue this
analysis also to show that systematic patterns in product entry are inconsistent with a simple stochastic model where
exporters are just random collections of products.
10Table 1: Overlaps between Reference Countries and Rest of World by Product Rank
Product Reference country: USA Reference country: Argentina
rank Overlap Overlap #Dest./ #Firms Overlap Overlap #Dest./ #Firms
in Ref. top prd. ﬁrm top prd. ﬁrm
country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 .83 .83 8.9 2,280 .77 .77 7.8 3,071
2 .54 .77 13.0 1,033 .54 .76 10.7 1,672
4 .36 .73 18.9 368 .38 .67 14.2 797
8 .34 .69 24.1 137 .30 .63 18.5 307
16 .26 .59 24.3 63 .24 .54 22.6 136
32 .24 .53 30.2 22 .22 .50 29.7 48
64 .15 .49 38.9 10 .29 .40 35.9 19
128 .13 .69 42.4 5 .11 .33 43.8 12
Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: Destination counts in columns 3 and 7 are mean numbers of destinations to which ﬁrms with at least as many
products as reported for a rank ship. Overlap in columns 1 and 5 is the proportion of destinations that a product of
reported rank reaches relative to the overall destination counts (in columns 3 and 7). Overlap in columns 2 and 6 is
the proportion of destinations that the top-selling product of ﬁrms with at least as many products as reported for a
rank reaches relative to the overall destination counts (in columns 3 and 7). Products at the HS 6-digit level, ranked
by decreasing export value within ﬁrm in reference country. Sample restricted to ﬁrm-products that ship to reference
country and at least one other destination.
First, withinaﬁrm, theleadingproductshavesystematicallyhighersalesmarketbymarket. We
number products within a ﬁrm and a destination by their rank in the ﬁrm’s local sales, assigning
rank one to the ﬁrm’s top-selling product at a destination, rank two to the ﬁrm’s second-to-top
product at the destination, and so forth. For each given HS 6-digit product that a ﬁrm sells in the
United States we correlate the ﬁrm-product’s rank elsewhere with the ﬁrm-product’s U.S. rank. We
ﬁnd a correlation coefﬁcient of .747 and a Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient of .837.17
Second, lower ranked products reach systematically fewer destinations. Table 1 documents
that the number of destinations where a ﬁrm ships a product drops with the product’s rank in the
referencecountry. Considerthetop-rankedproductintheUnitedStatesforthe2,280ﬁrmsthatship
at least one product to the United States (including single-product exporters to the United States).
These ﬁrms reach 8.9 destinations on average and their top-selling product ships to 83 percent
of the destinations that the ﬁrms reach with any product. Firms that sell at least two products in
the United States reach on average 13.0 destinations but their second-ranked product only ships
to a fraction of 54 percent of the destinations reached with any product. This fraction drops to
17When we repeat the exercise for Argentina (the second most important Brazilian export destination) as reference
country, we ﬁnd an even higher correlation coefﬁcient of .785 and a Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient of .860
for the same ﬁrm’s and same product’s ranks elsewhere.
1136 percent for the fourth-ranked product for ﬁrms with at least 4 products in the United States
and to 13 percent for the 128th ranked product. For Argentina as a reference country, the fraction
drops systematically from 77 percent for the top-selling product to 11 percent for the 128th ranked
product.
Finally, we report evidence that export scale per product is positively associated at the indi-
vidual ﬁrm-product level, within industries and destinations (and not just across groups of ﬁrms
as Fact 3 showed). For our sample of manufacturing exporters and their individual manufactured
products, a regression of the log sales per product in a market on the seller’s log exporter scope
in the same market, controlling for industry and destination ﬁxed effects, documents a coefﬁcient
that is positive (0.072) and statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. So,
wide-scope exporters in a destination also receive systematically higher revenues for each individ-
ual product. This ﬁnding refutes the hypothesis that a ﬁrm is a random collection of products. For
a random collection of products, the exporter scale would be independent of the exporter scope in
a market.18
We turn to a model of exporting that generates the three stylized facts, and then revisit the
data to empirically evaluate the derived relationships. The model strives to explain the behavior
of multi-product exporters and to be quantitatively meaningful when matching the multi-product
facts at successive levels of aggregation. The characteristic log-linear relationships in the data will
motivate the choice of functional forms later.
3 A Model of Exporter Scope and Exporter Scale
Our model rests on a single source of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Firms sell one or multiple products
in the markets where they enter. There are three key ingredients: a ﬁrm’s overall productivity
that affects all products of the ﬁrm worldwide; ﬁrm-product speciﬁc efﬁciency that determines
individual product sales worldwide; and local ﬁxed entry costs that depend on the number of
products that a ﬁrm sells in each destination market.
18If ﬁrms drew their product sizes from the same distribution (even if this distribution were truncated so that only a
fraction of the ﬁrm’s products made it to a given market), then the scale of each ﬁrm-product would not be related to
the ﬁrm’s scope.
123.1 Consumers
There are N countries. We label the source country of an export shipment with s and the export
destination with d. There is a measure of Ld consumers at destination d. Consumers have sym-
metric preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution σ over a continuum of varieties. In
our multi-product setting, a conventional “variety” offered by a ﬁrm ω from source country s to














where Gsd(ω) is the number of products that ﬁrm ω sells in country d and xsdg(ω) is the quantity
of product g that consumers consume. In marketing terminology, the product composite is often
called a ﬁrm’s product line or product mix. We assume that every product line is uniquely offered
by a single ﬁrm, but a ﬁrm may ship different product lines to different destinations.











for σ > 1, (1)
where Ωkd is the set of ﬁrms that ship from source country k to destination d. For simplicity we
assume that the elasticity of substitution across a ﬁrm’s products is the same as the elasticity of
substitution between varieties of different ﬁrms.19
The representative consumer earns a wage wd from inelastically supplying her unit of labor
endowment to producers in country d and receives a per-capita dividend distribution πd equal to
her share 1/Ld in total proﬁts at national ﬁrms. We denote total income with Yd = (wd + πd)Ld.








19In Appendix C (and in our companion paper Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) for a continuum of products), we
generalize the model to consumer preferences with two nests. The inner nest contains the products of a ﬁrm, which
are substitutes with an elasticity of ε. The outer nest aggregates those ﬁrm-level product lines over ﬁrms and source
countries, where the product lines are substitutes with a different elasticity σ ̸= ε. In this paper we set ε = σ. The
general case of ε ̸= σ is fully consistent with the key regularities that we uncover but it introduces additional degrees
of freedom into the model that cannot be disciplined with three-dimensional ﬁrm-product-destination data such as
ours.
Allanson and Montagna (2005) adopt a similar nested CES form to study the product life-cycle and market structure,
and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) use a similar nested CES form in a heterogeneous-ﬁrms model of trade but do not
consider multi-product ﬁrms.
13where psdg is the price of product g in market d and we denote by Td the total spending of con-
sumer in country d. In the calibration, we will allow for the possibility that total spending Td is
different from country output Yd so that we use different notation for the two terms. We deﬁne the


















Following Chaney (2008), we assume that there is a continuum of potential producers of measure
Js in each source country s. Productivity is the only source of ﬁrm heterogeneity so that, under the
model assumptions below, ﬁrms of the same type ϕ from country s face an identical optimization
problem in every destination d. Since all ﬁrms with productivity ϕ will make identical decisions in
equilibrium, it is convenient to name them by their common characteristic ϕ from now on.
A ﬁrm of type ϕ chooses the number of products Gsd(ϕ) to sell to a given market d. The ﬁrm
makes each product g ∈ {1,2,...,Gsd(ϕ)} with a linear production technology, employing local
labor with efﬁciency ϕg. When exported, a product incurs a standard iceberg trade cost so that
τsd > 1 units must be shipped from s for one unit to arrive at destination d. We normalize τss = 1
for domestic sales. Note that this iceberg trade cost is common to all ﬁrms and to all ﬁrm-products
shipping from s to d.
Withoutlossofgeneralityweordereachﬁrm’sproductsintermsoftheirefﬁciencysothatϕ1 ≥
ϕ2 ≥ ... ≥ ϕGsd. Ranking products by consumer appeal would generate isomorphic results for
within-ﬁrm product sales heterogeneity. A ﬁrm will enter export market d with the most efﬁcient
product ﬁrst and then expand its scope moving up the marginal-cost ladder product by product.





′(g) > 0. (4)
We normalize h(1) = 1 so that ϕ1 = ϕ. We think of the function h(g) : [0,+∞) → [1,+∞)
as a continuous and differentiable function but we will consider its values at discrete points g =
1,2,...,Gsd as appropriate.20
20Considering the function in its whole domain allows us to express various conditions in a general form as we
will illustrate later on. The function h(g) could be considered destination speciﬁc but such generality would introduce
degrees of freedom that are not required for our analysis.
14By varying ﬁrm-product efﬁciencies, some products will sell systematically more across mar-
kets (as empirically documented in Section 2.3 above). In turn, the assumption that the ﬁrm faces
a drop in efﬁciency for each additional product when its exporter scope widens is a common as-
sumption in multi-product models of exporters. Similar models are Eckel and Neary (2010), who
deﬁne the product with the highest efﬁciency as the “core competency” of the ﬁrm, and Mayer,
Melitz, and Ottaviano (2009). Nocke and Yeaple (2006), in contrast, assume that wider scope
reduces efﬁciency for all infra-marginal products.













This efﬁciency index will play an important role in the ﬁrm’s optimality conditions for scope
choice. Since the marginal-cost schedule strictly increases in exporter scope, a ﬁrm’s product
efﬁciency index strictly decreases as its exporter scope widens, resembling the insight from the
stochastic ﬁrm-product model of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a).
As the ﬁrm widens its exporter scope, it also faces a product-destination speciﬁc incremental
local entry cost fsd(g) that is zero at zero scope and strictly positive otherwise:21
fsd(0) = 0 and fsd(g) > 0 for all g = 1,2,...,Gsd, (6)
where fsd(g) is a continuous function in [1,+∞).
The incremental local entry cost fsd(g) accommodates ﬁxed costs of production (e.g. with
0 < fss(g) < fsd(g)). In a market, the incremental local entry costs fsd(g) may increase or




necessarily increase with exporter scope Gsd in country d because fsd(g) > 0.22 We assume that
the incremental local entry costs fsd(g) are paid in terms of importer (destination country) wages
21Brambilla (2009) adopts a related speciﬁcation but its implications are not explored in an equilibrium ﬁrm-product
model.
22As long as the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst product causes a nontrivial ﬁxed local entry cost, we do not need any additional ﬁxed
local entry cost. In continuous product space with nested CES utility, in contrast, local entry costs must be non-zero
at zero scope because a ﬁrm would otherwise export to all destinations worldwide (see Arkolakis and Muendler 2010,
Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2010a).
15so that Fsd(Gsd) is homogeneous of degree one in wd. Combined with the preceding varying
ﬁrm-product efﬁciencies, this local entry cost structure allows us to endogenize the exporter scope
choice at each destination d.
In summary, there are two scope-dependent cost components in our model, the marginal cost
schedule h(g) and the incremental local entry cost fsd(g). Suppose for a moment that the in-
cremental local entry cost is constant and independent of g with fsd(g) = fsd. Then a ﬁrm in
our model faces diseconomies of scope because the marginal-cost schedule h(g) strictly increases
with the product index g. But, if incremental local entry costs decrease sufﬁciently strongly with
g, there could be overall economies of scope.
A ﬁrm with a productivity ϕ from country s faces the following optimization problem for















The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to individual prices psdg imply product prices
psdg(ϕ) = ~ σ τsd ws h(g)/ϕ (7)
with an identical markup over marginal cost ~ σ ≡ σ/(σ−1) > 1 for σ > 1.23 A ﬁrm’s choice of
























where H(Gsd) is a ﬁrm’s product efﬁciency index from (5). The term H(Gsd(ϕ))−(σ−1) strictly
increases in Gsd(ϕ).
















23Similarly, in continuous product space (Arkolakis and Muendler 2010) the optimal markup does not vary with
exporter scope for constant elasticities of substitution under monopolistic competition (even in the general case of
different elasticities of substitution ε ̸= σ).
16Note: Operating proﬁts for the core product are πg=1(ϕ) = [P ϕ/(~ σ τ w)]σ 1T/σ. Combined incremental scope costs
z(g) ≡ f(g)h(g)σ 1 strictly increase in g by Assumption 1, with f(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1.
Figure 4: Optimal Exporter Scope
For proﬁt maximization with respect to exporter scope to be well deﬁned, we impose the following
condition.
Assumption 1 (Strictly increasing combined incremental scope costs). Combined incremental
scope costs zsd(G) ≡ fsd(G)h(G)σ−1 strictly increase in exporter scope G.
Under this assumption, the optimal choice for Gsd(ϕ) is the largest G ∈ {0,1,...} such that
operating proﬁts from that product equal (or still exceed) the incremental local entry costs:
(
Pd















σ−1 ≡ zsd(G). (10)
Operating proﬁts from the core product are π
g=1
sd (ϕ), and operating proﬁts from each additional
product g are π
g=1
sd (ϕ)/h(g)σ−1.
Figure 4 depicts the choice of optimal exporter scope. A ﬁrm will keep widening its exporter
scope as long as adding products does not reduce total proﬁts. Equivalently, a ﬁrm will keep
widening scope as long as incremental scope costs zsd(g) are weakly less than the ﬁrm’s core
17operating proﬁts π
g=1
sd (ϕ). In this optimality condition, incremental local entry cost and costs from
declining product efﬁciency enter multiplicatively and their product must increase in scope for a
well deﬁned optimum to exist. Thus, Assumption 1 is comparable to a second-order condition
(for perfectly divisible scope in the continuum version of the model, Assumption 1 is equivalent
to the second order condition). When Assumption 1 holds we will say that a ﬁrm faces overall
diseconomies of scope.
We can express the condition for optimal scope more intuitively and evaluate the optimal scope
of different ﬁrms. Firm ϕ exports from s to d iff πsd(ϕ) ≥ 0. At the break-even point πsd(ϕ) = 0,
the ﬁrm is ﬁrm is indif and only iferent between selling its ﬁrst product to market d and remaining
absent. Equivalently, reformulating the break-even condition and using the above expression for
minimum proﬁtable scope, the productivity threshold ϕ∗












In general, we can deﬁne the productivity threshold ϕ
∗,G
sd such that ﬁrms with ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗,G
sd sell at




































so that more productive ﬁrms introduce more products in a given market. So Gsd(ϕ) is a step-
function that weakly increases in ϕ.
Using the above deﬁnitions, we can rewrite individual product sales (8) and total sales (9) as




























The following proposition summarizes the ﬁndings.
18Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then for all s,d ∈ {1,...,N}
• exporter scope Gsd(ϕ) is positive and weakly increases in ϕ for ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
sd;
• total ﬁrm exports tsd(ϕ) are positive and strictly increase in ϕ for ϕ ≥ ϕ∗
sd.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows directly from the discussion above. The second statement fol-
lows because H(Gsd(ϕ))−(σ−1) strictly increases in Gsd(ϕ) and Gsd(ϕ) weakly increases in ϕ so
that tsd(ϕ) strictly increases in ϕ by (14).
The ﬁrm’s equilibrium choices for total sales tsd(ϕ) and the number of products sold Gsd(ϕ)















conditional on exporting from s to d. In Section 2, we presented scope-weighted mean exporter
scale. Exporter scale asd(ϕ) is tightly related to scope-weighted mean exporter scale: if asd(ϕ)
is a monotonic function of productivity then scope-weighted mean exporter scale is a monotonic
function of productivity.24 In our model, it is easy to work with asd(ϕ) so we will characterize
its analytical properties to describe scope-weighted mean exporter scale. Under an additional
restriction, asd(ϕ) increases in ﬁrm productivity ϕ and therefore also in ﬁrm total sales:
Restriction 1 (Strongoveralldiseconomiesofscope).Combinedincrementalscopecostszsd(G) ≡




Restriction 1 is more stringent than Assumption 1 in that the restriction not only requires zsd to
increase with G but that the increase be more than proportional. We can then state the following
result.25
Proposition 2 If zsd(G) satisﬁes Restriction 1, then exporter scale asd(ϕ) strictly increases in ϕ at








24To see this note that (t(ϕ) + x)/(G(ϕ) + y) ≤ x/y ⇐⇒ t(ϕ)/G(ϕ) ≤ x/y. So if t/G declines then excluding
lower percentiles in scope-weighted mean exporter scale leads to increases in its value.
25Whereas the proposition demonstrates that the function asd(ϕ) generically increases in ϕ, this statement is not
true for all ϕ. The simple reason is that the choice of products (the denominator of the function asd(ϕ)) is a step
function that depends on combined incremental scope costs zsd(G). The summation in the numerator of asd(ϕ) is also
a step function but one that only depends on h(G), thus rendering stronger statements about asd(ϕ) elusive.
19Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This proposition is particularly informative in situations where fsd(g) is a strictly decreasing
function. In such situations a highly productive ﬁrm adds many low-selling products because the
ﬁrm can generate additional proﬁts from these products as fsd(g) declines. So it is possible in such
situations that wide-scope ﬁrms would have low exporter scale. Restriction 1, however, sufﬁces
to guarantee that scale increases even if fsd(g) is a strictly decreasing function: it implies that the
efﬁciencies of marginal products decline so fast that only highly productive ﬁrms introduce them.
These productive ﬁrms have high sales for their top selling products, which means that their overall
scale is larger.26
The model can also parsimoniously generate the concentration of a ﬁrm’s sales in its core
products. To do that we need to introduce an additional sufﬁcient restriction on h(g).




g=1 h(g)−(σ−1) ∈ (0,+∞).
A number of conventional real analysis tests (e.g. the root test or the ratio test, see Rudin
1976, ch. 3) can be used to determine whether the sum converges by looking at the limiting terms
h(g)−(σ−1) as g → ∞. Formally, when this sum converges, the minimum share of a product g′ is
bounded from below by the ﬁnite number h(g′)−(σ−1)/
∑+∞
g=1 h(g)−(σ−1). Intuitively, Restriction 2
impliesthatthe“core”productsaccountforasigniﬁcantshareoftotalsales, whichremainbounded
even if many additional products are added.
4 Model Equilibrium and Model Predictions
To derive clear predictions for the model equilibrium we specify a Pareto distribution of ﬁrm pro-
ductivity following Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney (2008). A ﬁrm’s productivity
ϕ is drawn from a Pareto distribution with a source-country dependent location parameter bs and
a shape parameter θ over the support [bs,+∞) for s = 1,...,N. So the cumulative distribution
26Restriction 1 is a sufﬁcient condition for the proposition. Examples can be found where Restriction 1 fails but
asd(ϕ) generically still increases in ϕ. The result that scale increases with scope is not trivial and does not necessarily
generalize to other setups. In the Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010a) multi-product model, for instance, it can be
shown that asd(ϕ) is constant under a Pareto distribution of product-speciﬁc demand shocks.
20function of ϕ is Pr = 1−(bs)θ/ϕθ and the probability density function is θ(bs)θ/ϕθ+1, where more
advanced countries are thought to have a higher location parameter bs. Therefore the measure of
















4.1 Equilibrium and the gravity equation of trade
Under the Pareto assumption we can compute several aggregate statistics for the model. We denote
aggregate bilateral sales of ﬁrms from s to country d with Tsd. The corresponding average sales












To compute  Fsd in terms of fundamentals we need two further necessary assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Pareto probability mass in low tail). The Pareto shape parameter satisﬁes θ >
σ−1.
Assumption 3 (Bounded local entry costs and product efﬁciency). Incremental local entry costs
and product efﬁciency satisfy
∑∞
G=1 fsd(G)−(~ θ−1)h(G)−θ ∈ (0,+∞), where ~ θ ≡ θ/(σ−1).
Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantee that average sales per ﬁrm are positive and ﬁnite.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then for all s,d ∈ {1,...,N}, average














where ~ θ ≡ θ/(σ−1).
21Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The share of total local entry costs in total exports  Fsd/ Tsd only depends on the model’s param-
eters θ and σ, even though local entry costs vary by source and destination country. So, despite
ﬁrm-product heterogeneity, bilateral average sales can be summarized with a function only of the
parameters θ and σ and the properties of average local entry costs  Fsd.
Finally, we can use deﬁnition (16) of Msd together with deﬁnition (11) of ϕ∗
sd and expres-
sion (19) for average sales to derive bilateral expenditure shares of country d on products from
country s
λsd =
Msd  Tsd ∑
k Mkd  Tkd
=
Js(bs)θ(wsτsd)−θ fsd(1)−~ θ  Fsd ∑
k Jk(bk)θ(wkτkd)−θ fkd(1)−~ θ  Fkd
, (20)
where ~ θ ≡ θ/(σ−1), and fsd(1)−~ θ  Fsd =
∑∞
G=1 fsd(G)−(~ θ−1)h(G)−θ by equation (19).
Remarkably, the elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs is −θ, as in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Chaney (2008).27 Thus, our framework is consistent with bilateral gravity. The
difference between our model, in terms of aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows, and the framework of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) is that ﬁxed costs affect bilateral trade similar to Chaney (2008). Beyond
previous work, we provide a micro-foundation as to how entry cost components affect aggregate
bilateral trade through the weighted sum
∑∞
G=1 fsd(G)−(~ θ−1)h(G)−θ. So our model offers a tool to
evaluate the responsiveness of overall trade to changes in individual entry cost components.
The partial elasticity ηλ,f(g) of trade with respect to a product g’s entry cost component is
−(~ θ−1) times the product’s share in the weighted sum. To assess the relative importance of
the extensive margin of exporting products, relative to ﬁrm entry with the core product, we can






for g = 2,... and the standardization h(1) = 1. Our model does not restrict this ratio to increase
or decrease with g as a product becomes less important in the within-ﬁrm sales distribution. It
therefore remains an empirical matter to quantify the importance of product entry relative to ﬁrm
entry when entry costs change.
We can also compute mean exporter scope in a destination. For the average number of products
to be ﬁnite we will need the necessary assumption that
27In our model, the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs is the negative Pareto shape parameter, whereas it
is the negative Fr´ echet shape parameter in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
22Assumption 4 (Strongly increasing combined incremental scope costs). Combined incremental
scope costs satisfy
∑∞
G=1 zsd(G)−~ θ ∈ (0,+∞).
This assumption is in general more restrictive than Assumption 1. It requires that combined incre-
mental scope costs Z(G) do not just increase in G, but increase at a rate faster than 1/~ θ.28



























−(θ+1) dϕ + ...
]
.
Completing the integration, rearranging terms and using equation (12), we obtain
 Gsd = fsd(1)
~  ∑∞
G=1 zsd(G)−~ θ. (22)
The expression implies that mean exporter scope is invariant to destination market characteristics
other than local entry costs. A priori there is no reason why mean exporter scope  Gsd should
be related to bilateral distance between s and d or to the size of the destination market. This
implication resonates with the evidence of highly robust scope distributions across destinations as
presented in Section 2.2.29
We turn to the model’s equilibrium. Notice that total manufacturing output of a country s
equals its total sales across all destinations:
Ys =
∑N
k=1 λsk Tk. (23)
Additionally, Proposition 3 implies that a country’s total spending on ﬁxed local entry costs is a
constant (source country invariant) share of bilateral exports. This result implies that the share of
wages in total income is constant (source country invariant). To see why observe that the share
of net proﬁts from bilateral sales is the share of gross variable proﬁts in total sales 1/σ less the
ﬁxed costs paid and divided by total sales (~ θ−1)/~ θσ. Thus, using the result of Proposition 3,
πsdLd/Tsd = 1/σ − (~ θ−1)/(~ θσ) = 1/(~ θσ) = 1/(θ ~ σ). Total proﬁts for country s are πsLs =
∑
k λsk Tk/(~ θσ), where
∑
k λskTk is the country’s total income by (23). So proﬁt income and




G=1[Z(G)] ~ θ and notice that the ratio
rule (see Rudin 1976, ch. 3) requires that Z(G) increases at a rate faster than 1/~ θ so that the sum converges.
29A regression of Brazil’s mean exporter scope on two main source-destination characteristics—market share and
import market size (see Appendix D.1)—shows that mean exporter scope responds relatively little to country charac-
teristics, whereas the number of ﬁrms shipping to a destination is closely related to those characteristics (similar to
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2004).
23Table 2: Parametric Functional Forms
Condition Parameter values
Ass. 1 Strictly increasing combined incremental scope costs δ + α(σ−1) > 0
Ass. 2 Pareto probability mass in low tail θ > σ−1
Ass. 3 Bounded local entry costs δ + α(σ−1) > (δ+1)/~ θ
Ass. 4 Strongly increasing combined incremental scope costs δ + α(σ−1) > 1/~ θ
Restr. 1 Strong overall diseconomies of scope δ + α(σ−1) > 1
Restr. 2 Bounded ﬁrm-product efﬁciency α(σ−1) > 1
Note: Functional forms fsd(g) = fsd · gδ and h(g) = gα by (25).








We can now deﬁne an equilibrium in this economy, assuming for simplicity that trade is bal-
anced with Yd = Td. (We will relax this assumption in the calibration.) Given τsd, Js, bs and
deﬁnitions (16) and (17) for all s,d = 1,...,N, an equilibrium is a set of ﬁrm-product consump-
tion allocations for the representative consumer xsdg(ϕ) and prices and exporter scopes for the
representative ﬁrms [psdg(ϕ),Gsd(ϕ)] for g = 1,...,Gsd(ϕ) and ϕ ∈ Ωsd, and a set of wages
ws, such that (i) equation (2) is the solution of the representative consumer optimization program,
(ii) equations (7) and (10) solve the ﬁrm proﬁt maximization programs, (iii) the current account
balance condition (23) holds in every country s where λsd is given by (20), and (iv) Pd and ϕ
∗,G
sd
jointly satisfy equations (3) and (11) with Ys given by equation (24).
4.2 Predictions for the cross section of ﬁrms
Parametrizing the model allows us to quantitatively match the patterns that we observe in the
Brazilian data. Guided by the various log-linear relationships observed in Section 2.2 we set
fsd(g) = fsd · gδ for δ ∈ (−∞,+∞),
h(g) = gα for α ∈ [0,+∞).
(25)
We ﬁrst consider the necessary assumptions for equilibrium existence. Table 2 lists the condi-
tions for the parametric functions. Assumption 4 implies Assumption 1. It depends on the sign of δ
whether Assumption 3, which is needed to generate ﬁnite aggregate exports, implies Assumption 1
24(or Assumption 4).30
Additional model restrictions generate desired facts. Restriction 1, by which the combined
incremental scope costs increase in scope with an elasticity of more than one, translates into δ +
α(σ−1) > 1. So Restriction 1 is more stringent than Assumption 1 (and than Assumption 4).
Finally, Restriction 2 implies that α(σ−1) > 1 and its relationship to Restriction 1 depends on the
sign of δ.
The optimal number of products for ﬁrms with ϕ ≥ ϕ∗










Using this relationship and equation (13) we can express optimal sales of a ﬁrm ϕ’s g-th product










































Note that the restriction δ + α(σ−1) > 1 (Restriction 1) is a sufﬁcient condition for asd(ϕ) to
increase with Gsd but not a necessary one since H(Gsd)−(σ−1) also increases in scope.
Under the parametrization, the partial elasticity of trade (21) with respect to an additional










+ αθ > 1 and ~ θ > 1.
By parametrization (25), the combined ﬁxed cost function fsd(1) ~ θ  Fsd(ν) ≡ fsd(1)
~ θ 1 ∑1
G=1(G) ν contains a
Riemann zeta function ζ(ν) ≡
∑1
G=1 G ν for a real parameter ν ≡ ~ θ[δ + α(σ−1)] + δ.
25for g = 2,.... The power is strictly negative if and only if δ + α(σ−1) > δ/~ θ. So it depends on
the sign and magnitude of δ whether the elasticity of trade with respect to an additional product’s
ﬁxed cost is higher or lower than the elasticity of ﬁrm entry.
4.3 Relation to regularities
We relate the model’s predictions to Facts 1 through 3 as presented in Section 2.2. By Fact 1
(Figure 1), a ﬁrm’s sales within a destination are concentrated in few core products. In the model,
the degree of concentration is regulated by how fast expression h(g) increases with g (the elasticity
α(σ−1), which we will estimate in the next section). Thus, this fact is intimately related to
Restriction 2. Note that Figure 1 also implies that wide-scope exporters sell more of their top-
selling products than ﬁrms with few products. The model’s equation (27) matches this fact under
Assumption 1. Finally, the fact that wide-scope exporters sell their lowest-ranked products for tiny
amounts suggests that product efﬁciency (or consumer appeal) strongly declines for those products
and that ﬁxed entry costs for these products are low. Our estimation will quantify the magnitudes.
Fact 2 (Figure 2) documents a high frequency of narrow-scope and small-sales ﬁrms in the
distributions of Brazilian exporters. The model’s predictions for the scope distribution of exporters
depend critically on the functional forms that we specify for fsd(g) and h(g). Our parametriza-
tion (25) implies that Gsd(ϕ) is Pareto distributed in the upper tail with shape parameter ~ θ[δ+α(σ−
1)]. Under this parametrization the model can potentially match the fast decline in the number of
ﬁrms selling products to a destination market. Predictions regarding the overall sales distribution
are less dependent on the functional form choices for fsd(g) or h(g). Restriction 2 is a sufﬁcient
condition for equation (28) to exhibit a Pareto distribution in the upper tail. In that case total ﬁrm
exports are Pareto distributed with shape parameter −~ θ in the upper tail, which is reminiscent of
results in the Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010) models.31
Last, we consider conditions under which the model generates Fact 3 (Figure 3), the positive
relationship between exporter scope and scope-weighted mean exporter scale. Restriction 1 on
31To see that sales are Pareto distributed notice that the sales percentile Pr of a ﬁrm with productivity ϕ is given by
1 − Pr = (ϕ
sd/ϕ)θ. So we can express equation (14) as







Since a ﬁrm’s product efﬁciency index converges to a constant as tsd(ϕ) → ∞ and Pr → 1, this expression means
that sales are Pareto distributed in the upper tail with a shape parameter ~ θ.
26the combined incremental scope costs zsd(G) is sufﬁcient for this to happen, as summarized by
Proposition 2. Under our parametrization (25), exporter scale asd(ϕ) (and thus scope-weighted
mean exporter scale  asd(ϕ)) and exporter scope Gsd(ϕ) are positively associated if δ+α(σ−1) > 1,
that is if there is a sufﬁciently strong decline in product efﬁciency with scope.
We now apply the model to the Brazilian data and estimate parameters for the functional
forms (25). Our estimation target is the within-ﬁrm product sales distribution, using the same
data that we used to generate Figure 1. To then evaluate the model’s performance, we use the
within-ﬁrm estimates to simulate cross-ﬁrm relationships regarding exporter scope and exporter
scale as in Figures 2 and 3.
5 Estimation
Equation (27) is the basis for our estimation. We augment the equation by a multiplicative sales
disturbance ϵsdg, which may be due to unanticipated demand shocks after pre-determined scope
choice, or optimization and measurement error. We estimate the equation in its log form:







+ lnσfsd(1) + lnϵsdg(ϕ).
This equation is closely related to Figure 1 (Fact 1). Whereas Figure 1 presents the averages across
ﬁrms for products with the same rank, equation (27) relates individual product sales directly to
exporter scope and the product’s rank within the ﬁrm. Consistent with that Figure, equation (27)
implies that product sales increase in exporter scope and drop with the product’s rank within the
ﬁrm. Our identiﬁcation of parameters δ and α(σ−1) relies on these two relationships between ﬁrm
scope and individual product sales.
Beyond the disturbance lnϵsdg, there are two more unobserved components in the estimation
equation. The ﬁrst unobserved component, lnσ, is common to all ﬁrms. The second unob-
served component, (σ−1)ln(ϕ/ϕ
∗,G
sd ), varies by ﬁrm and destination and we capture it with ﬁrm-
destination ﬁxed effects.32 To assess the robustness of the relationship we estimate equation (27)
with alternative sets of ﬁxed effects.




sd )σ 1 tends to
one as Gsd becomes large.
27Table 3: Individual Product Sales
Firm-destination-prod. data
estimator Ind. FE Ind. FE Firm FE Firm-dest. FE
controls Dest. Dest.
Log Exp./prod. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log # Products 1.396 1.319 1.557 1.273
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Log Product Rank -2.558 -2.574 -2.624 -2.656
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Scope elast. of local entry cost (δ) -1.162 -1.256 -1.067 -1.383
Scope elast. of prod. efﬁciency (α(σ−1)) 2.558 2.574 2.624 2.656
Observations 162,570 162,570 162,570 162,570
Panels 259 259 10,215 27,362
R2 (within) .462 .510 .582 .618
Corr. Firm FE, X′β .085 -.055
Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: Products at the Harmonized-System 6-digit level. Constant (as well as industry and destination ﬁxed effects in
columns 1 through 3) included but not reported. R2 is within ﬁt (relative to industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects). Standard
errors in parentheses. Regression equation








Table 3 documents that different speciﬁcations result in strikingly robust estimates of δ + α(σ−1)
and α(σ−1) for Brazilian manufacturers and their manufacturing products. Across speciﬁcations
in Table 3, δ falls in the range from −1.07 to −1.38 and α(σ−1) in the range from 2.56 to 2.66.33
The magnitude of the δ estimate implies that incremental local entry costs drop at an elasticity of
up to around −1.4 when manufacturers introduce additional products in a market with a presence.
But ﬁrm-product efﬁciency drops off even faster with an elasticity of around 2.6 or more. Adding
the two ﬁxed scope cost coefﬁcients suggests that there are net overall diseconomies of scope with
a scope elasticity of 1.2 or more. The coefﬁcient estimates also suggest that both Restriction 1
and 2 are satisﬁed in our data.
To assess the robustness of our estimates we perform two more estimation exercises. First,
we aggregate the data as in Figure 1 (Fact 1) and ﬁt the according regression equation with non-
linear least squares under literature-guided calibrations of the free parameter ~ θ (see Appendix D.2).
33When we allow the coefﬁcients on log exporter scope and log product rank to vary across 29 industries (ISIC
3-digit) in the speciﬁcation of column 4, then δ falls in the range from −1.19 to −1.59 for 25 out of 29 industries, and
α(σ−1) in the range from 2.23 to 3.38 (see our online Data Appendix).
28Regardlessoffreeparameterchoice, weﬁndforδ+α(σ−1)estimatesof1.60to1.61andforα(σ−1)
estimates of 2.55, close to the estimates in Table 3. Second, we move on to estimate parameters
also from the cross section of ﬁrms. Note that the slopes of the graphs in Figure 3 (Fact 3) are
equal to the respective Pareto shape parameters and observe that our parametrization implies that
Gsd(ϕ) is Pareto distributed in the upper tail with shape parameter ~ θ[δ +α(σ−1)] by equation (26)
and asd(ϕ) is Pareto distributed in the upper tail with shape parameter ~ θ[δ + α(σ−1)]/[δ + α(σ−
1) − 1] by equation (29). So the ratio of the two Pareto shape parameters also yields an estimate
of δ + α(σ−1). For the United States and Argentina in Figure 3, for instance, we ﬁt the graphs to
linear relationships as implied by the Pareto distribution and ﬁnd estimates for δ+α(σ−1) of 1.88
and 1.66, respectively, with R2 above 97 percent in the individual regression. These are reasonably
close to the implied estimates of δ + α(σ−1) between 1.27 and 1.56 in Table 3.
Supportive evidence on our main mechanisms comes from empirical studies in industrial or-
ganization. As regards declining product sales with wider scope, there is evidence that production
costs increase for ﬁrms that introduce more products (e.g. Bayus and Putsis 1999 for PCs). Our
ﬁnding of economies of scope in market-speciﬁc entry costs echoes related evidence of falling mar-
keting costs with scope in the consumer goods industry (e.g. Morgan and Rego 2009, who deﬁne a
market segment by NAICS operating code similar to our deﬁnition of an HS-6 digit product) and
falling distribution costs in the ﬁnance industry (e.g. Cummins, Weiss, Xie, and Zi 2010). Beyond
a quantiﬁcation of diseconomies of scope, we are interested in their relationship to exporter entry
and implications for the ﬁrm size distribution and global trade.
Using our estimates, the power in the partial elasticity ratio (21) is strictly negative because
δ + α(σ−1) > 0 > δ/~ θ. So the partial elasticity of trade with respect to an additional product’s
ﬁxed cost is lower than the elasticity with respect to the core product. In other words, our estimates
imply that product entry at multi-product exporters should matter less than ﬁrm entry with the core
product. We will return to the magnitudes in our simulation.
5.2 Model predictions
To illustrate model predictions, we choose ~ θ = 1.28. This value falls within the range of parame-
terizations in the literature, so we use it as a benchmark in later simulations. In particular, Luttmer
(2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) use ~ θ = 1.06 as reported by Axtell (2001) and close
to Zipf’s Law. Arkolakis (2010) estimates ~ θ = 1.49 using the Chaney (2008) version of the Melitz
29Table 4: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source
Scope elasticity of local entry costs δ -1.38 Estimate (Table 3, col. 4)
Scope elasticity of product-introd. cost α(σ−1) 2.66 Estimate (Table 3, col. 4)
Pareto shape parameter of productivity θ 8.28 Eaton and Kortum (2002)
Elasticity of substitution betw. varieties σ 7.49 Broda and Weinstein (2006)
Pareto shape parameter of total sales ~ θ 1.28 ~ θ ≡ θ/(σ−1)
(2003) model with Pareto distributed productivity.34 For θ = 8.28 from Eaton and Kortum (2002),
for instance, a value of ~ θ = 1.28 implies σ = 7.49, which is in the range of demand elasticity
estimates reported by Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Based on our coefﬁcient estimates for Fact 1 on the within-ﬁrm size distribution, we evaluate
the calibrated model for Facts 2 and 3. We view these predictions as over-identifying checks on
the model in the cross-section of ﬁrms. We simulate data from our estimated model and generate
statistics exactly as we did using the pristine data for Facts 2 and 3 discussed in Section 2.
The upper and middle panels of Figure 5 show the actual (left-hand side) and simulated (right-
hand side) exporter scope and mean sales distributions. Our estimate of δ + α(σ−1) = 1.27
implies overall diseconomies scope so that ﬁrms introduce more products only if they are much
more productive. Thus, unless the distribution of ﬁrms is strongly heterogeneous in sales (low ~ θ),
the model cannot fully replicate the number of products that highly productive ﬁrms adopt. From
the discussion in Section 4.2 and the fact that the coefﬁcient estimates imply α(σ−1) = 2.66 > 1
(in support of Restriction 2), it follows that the distribution of total sales is Pareto in the upper tail
with a coefﬁcient −~ θ (set to 1.28). The model simulation matches the upper tail well in our graph
for mean sales at or a above a given percentile, which weights down deviant small-ﬁrm behavior
in the low tail.
The lower panel of Figure 5 shows the model predictions for mean exporter scope and exporter
scale as functions of the overall ﬁrm size percentile. The model tracks reasonably well the distribu-
tion of mean exporter scope. This success comes despite the fact that the parameters δ and α(σ−1)
34The observation that the model exhibits a good ﬁt with a lower ~ θ than the estimate from more aggregate trade
data (as in Arkolakis 2010) is indicative of unmodelled within-ﬁrm heterogeneity (in addition to unmodelled ﬁrm
heterogeneity as in Arkolakis 2010). For we strive to explain multi-product ﬁrms’ optimal choices, we abstract from
idiosyncratic sales shocks per product and choose a value of θ at the midpoint of the range of existing estimates.
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Firm Percentiles in Total Exports from the Top
Mean Exporter Scope Firms’ Mean Product Scale
Source: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products to the United States.
Note: Products at HS 6-digit level. For simulations, we set α(σ−1) = 2.66 and δ = −1.38 from Table 3 (column 4),
θ = 8.28 following Eaton and Kortum (2002), and σ = 7.49 so that ~ θ = 1.28.
Figure 5: Exporter Scope and Exporter Scale and Their Model Predictions for the USA
31are estimated to match the within-ﬁrm heterogeneity of sales. A reason for the close prediction is
that averaging over all upper percentiles in cumulative graphs assigns little weight to small-scope
exporters. The estimated model can also generate the increase in the exporter scale with ﬁrm size
but falls short of delivering the exact magnitude of that increase. Adding random random sales
shocks per product to the model could improve its predictions in this dimension. Overall, we
ﬁnd the model’s quantitative performance satisfactory. The fact that parameter estimates to ﬁt the
within-ﬁrm sales heterogeneity (Fact 1) also deliver a good approximation to the cross-ﬁrm distri-
bution of exporter scope and a plausible approximation to the scope-weighted mean exporter scale
distribution reassures us of our estimates.
Having queried the predictions of the calibrated model in several dimensions we proceed to
perform counterfactual experiments of a hypothetical trade liberalization with respect to local entry
costs.
6 Counterfactuals
We conduct a counterfactual simulation to quantify the implied impact of our estimates for changes
to bilateral trade when market-speciﬁc entry costs drop. Brazil being close to the median country
in exports per capita, we consider our parameter estimates informative for global trade.35
To perform counterfactual experiments we add three ingredients to the model following Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2010). (i) We introduce intermediate inputs as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
In particular, we assume that the production of each product uses a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of
labor and a composite of all other manufacturing products with cost Pd. The labor share in man-





d , where we now think of wd as the input cost and Wd as the wage. (ii) There is
a non-manufacturing sector in each country as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) that combines manu-
factures with labor, in a Cobb-Douglas fashion, where manufactures have a share γ in GDP. The




d . We state the resulting equations in
Appendix A. (iii) We allow for a manufacturing trade deﬁcit Dd, and for an overall trade deﬁcit
DT
d in goods and services. Both deﬁcits are set to their observed levels in 2000.
35By the WTF and WDI data for all industries and countries, Brazil ranks at the 48th percentile (top 100th out of
192) in terms of exports per capita in 2000. In 2000, Brazil’s total exports are at the 88th percentile worldwide (top
27th out of 205).
32We compute the share of manufacturing in GDP for each country using data on GDP, man-
ufacturing production and trade (as described in Appendix D.3). We set the labor share in man-
ufacturing production to β = .330, the sample average for countries with available information
(Appendix D.3). To compute the impact of a counterfactual change in entry costs, we use the
Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) methodology (details in Appendix B). The merit of this method
is that it requires no information on the initial level of technology, iceberg trade costs, and entry
costs. Instead, we can compute the changes in all equilibrium variables using as a simple input the
percentage change in the underlying parameter of interest (entry cost parameters in our case).
We conduct two experiments with entry costs. The ﬁrst experiment is a 25-percent drop in the
entry costs of exporting the ﬁrst product ^ fsd(1) = .75 for s ̸= d. We interpret this experiment as
representing a decline in ﬁrm-level exporting cost such as one-time costs for information acquisi-
tion, search and matching costs for wholesale or retail representatives abroad, expenses for trade
fairs, the setup of certiﬁed and accredited testing facilities, investments in technology acquisition
for export development, one-time costs of product re-design and building up logistics for export,
and perhaps brand marketing costs.
The second experiment is a 25-percent drop in entry costs of exporting ^ fsd(g) = .75 for all
products g = 1,2,... and s ̸= d. We view this exercise as a counterfactual decrease of non-
variabletradecostbarriersthatapplytoallproductsrepeatedly, suchastechnicalbarrierstotrade.36
Examples of such trade barriers are product re-designs to meet local technical requirements or
energy-saving regulations, costs to satisfy performance requirements, costs of compliance with
voluntary safety rules or mandatory sanitary regulations including administrative and legal fees,
product-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of labelling and re-packaging, access costs to additional wholesale
representatives and retail shelve space, or labelling and marking costs for particular exporting
markets.
36The perceived importance of technical barriers to trade for individual products is reﬂected in dispute settlement
cases at the World Trade Organization. As of October 2010, out of the total 418 dispute settlement cases ever brought,
41 cases cite the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and 37 cases the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
agreements in their request for consultations. In numbers, these case counts are comparable to the 84 cases that cite
anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994) in the consultations request. The ﬁrst dispute settlement case ever brought
against the United States (DS2) cites the Technical Barriers to Trade agreement with regards to gasoline standards.
Maskus, Otsuki, and Wilson (2005) ﬁnd substantive ﬁxed costs of compliance with technical barriers to trade, ap-
proximately $425,000 per ﬁrm in survey data from 16 developing countries in the World Bank’s Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) Survey Database. Deardorff and Stern (1998) classify non-tariff trade barriers into six broad categories;
two of their categories correspond closely to entry costs: “technical barriers to trade” (quality standards, safety regula-
tions, packaging and labelling requirements) and speciﬁc “customs procedures and administrative practices” (startup
procedures and documentation requirements).
33Table 5: Simulation of Real-Wage Increase in Percent due to Decline in Entry Cost
25-percent decline θ = 8.28 θ = 4.87 θ = 8.28 θ = 4.87
product range 1st all 1st all 1st all 1st all
Armenia .06 .07 .11 .14 Kuwait .22 .27 .44 .52
Australia .18 .22 .33 .40 Kyrgyzstan .12 .14 .23 .27
Austria .36 .43 .67 .80 Latvia .50 .60 .86 1.02
Azerbaijan .13 .16 .25 .30 Lithuania .34 .41 .62 .75
BelgmLuxNthl .45 .53 .85 1.01 Malta 1.0 1.20 1.74 2.07
Bolivia .10 .12 .19 .23 Mexico .45 .54 .77 .92
Brazil .07 .08 .14 .16 Morocco .21 .25 .40 .48
Bulgaria .30 .36 .58 .69 Norway .23 .28 .44 .52
Canada .36 .43 .66 .79 Oman .36 .43 .64 .76
Chile .18 .22 .35 .42 Poland .22 .27 .44 .52
ChinaHKG .20 .23 .39 .47 Portugal .28 .34 .53 .64
Colombia .10 .12 .20 .24 Romania .27 .32 .52 .63
CostaRica .03 .04 .11 .13 RussianFed .11 .13 .24 .29
Cyprus .42 .50 .77 .93 Senegal .18 .21 .33 .40
Ethiopia .04 .05 .09 .11 Slovenia .47 .57 .90 1.07
Finland .17 .21 .38 .45 SouthKorea .19 .23 .40 .48
FranceMonaco .21 .25 .41 .48 Spain .20 .24 .39 .47
Germany .21 .25 .42 .50 SriLanka .18 .22 .35 .41
Hungary .69 .82 1.26 1.50 Sweden .16 .20 .36 .43
IndMalSgThai .47 .57 .94 1.13 TrinidadTbg .06 .07 .13 .15
India .31 .38 .57 .68 Tunisia .34 .41 .65 .78
Iran .08 .10 .17 .20 Turkey .15 .18 .29 .35
Ireland .26 .31 .67 .80 UK .19 .23 .38 .45
Israel .21 .25 .39 .47 USA .09 .10 .18 .21
Italy .16 .19 .33 .39 Ukraine .14 .17 .31 .38
Japan .05 .06 .11 .13 Uruguay .12 .15 .23 .28
Jordan .17 .21 .33 .40 VietNam .33 .40 .63 .76
Kazakhstan .28 .34 .51 .61 Yemen .10 .12 .22 .26
Kenya .05 .06 .12 .14 RestOfWorld .65 .77 1.13 1.35
World Avg. .25 .29 .47 .56
Notes: Own calculations, real wage change in percentage points. Values of θ = 8.28 as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
and θ = 4.87 as in Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010). See Appendix D.3 for data construction. Following Dekle,
Eaton, and Kortum (2007), we collapse (i) Hong Kong, Mac˜ ao and mainland China, (ii) Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands, and (iii) Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand into single entities.
34Table 5 summarizes the results for increases in real wages. In our model, relative real-wage
increases are proportional to relative increases in bilateral trade ﬂows. Our simulated real-wage
gains from declining entry costs are smaller than the ones typically found for falling variable trade
costs (e.g. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2010). The ﬁnding that declining ﬁxed costs may not have
a large impact on welfare is also similar to simulation results for home-market entry by di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2010). Our explanation differs, however. At the ﬁrm entry margin, we conﬁrm the
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) home-market simulation by which only small ﬁrms surpass the
entry threshold as ﬁxed costs decline; these ﬁrms create these ﬁrms create little additional trade.
For multi-product ﬁrms, however, the effect could potentially dif and only ifer if a reduction of
ﬁxed local entry costs induced the highly productive wide-scope ﬁrms to expand fast. But our
structural a strong decline in competency with scope when they take up additional products, so
there is also no strong increase in bilateral trade from the extensive margin of exporting products
at wide-scope ﬁrms.
Overall, the elasticity of trade with respect to ﬁxed costs −(~ θ−1) is close to zero and therefore
makes the aggregate impact of changes in ﬁxed costs small. If we use the lower value of θ = 4.87
for our simulations (the value considered by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz 2010), while keeping
~ θ = 1.28, then the welfare gains roughly double for all countries. So the value of θ = 4.87 strongly
alters the gains from changes in ﬁxed costs. Reliable estimates of θ, or equivalently of σ given ~ θ,
are an arguably important aspect of conﬁdence in trade simulations (see for example Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008).
As a ﬁnal check on the extensive margin of exporting products, we simulate a 25-percent drop
in variable trade costs ^ τsd = .75 for all products. Real-wage gains from trade with respect to
changes in variable trade costs are much larger and within the magnitudes reported by Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2010). However, these magnitudes are affected only to a minor degree
by changes in θ, reminiscent of results in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Bergstrand, Egger,
and Larch (2010). We decompose the gains from trade into the contributions at each margin, by
holding the other two margins constant at a time. The extensive margin of ﬁrm entry contributes
31 percent of the welfare gains from reduced variable trade costs. The extensive margin of product
entry from expanding exporter scope contributes only 5 percent. The bulk of welfare gains accrues
at the remaining intensive margin of the exporter’s average sales per product with 64 percent.
357 Concluding Remarks
We have used three-dimensional panel data of Brazilian exporters, their products and their destina-
tion markets to uncover the costs that exporters face in selling additional products and expanding
in individual markets. The level of detail of the Brazilian data and the multi-product model that we
develop allow us to follow a reductionist approach, relating bilateral trade in the aggregate back to
the product adoption decision at individual ﬁrms. Building up from a ﬁrm’s choices of destination
markets and local product lines, our model leads to relationships that are consistent with the disag-
gregated trade data but also with previous theories of trade such as Chaney (2008), Eaton, Kortum,
and Kramarz (2010), and Arkolakis (2010), which consider more aggregate trade ﬂows.
Estimation of this micro-founded model allows us to quantify the responsiveness of bilateral
trade to ﬁxed entry cost components. We ﬁnd in simulations that declines in ﬁxed entry costs
only lead to relatively small increases in trade from new products at incumbents because multi-
product exporters face relatively low incremental entry costs but strong declines in competency
when they take up additional products. Though our approach allows us to analyze trade data at
variouslevelsofaggregation, itneverthelessleavesrecentlyavailableinformationfrommicro-trade
data unexplored, including information on unit prices and time series information. Our approach
suggests that such additional information may prove valuable in understanding more precisely the
barriers that determine the choice of products and the span of exporters.
36Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal choice for Gsd(ϕ) is the largest Gsd ∈ {0,1,...} such that inequality (10),
(
Pd






is weakly satisﬁed, as shown in the text. In discrete product space, Gsd is an integer. For simplicity,
deﬁne ~ Gsd as the continuous variable that solves
zsd( ~ Gsd) =
(
Pd





where zsd(G) ≡ fsd(G)h(G)σ−1. zsd(G) strictly increases in G by Restriction 1. So zsd(G) is




can also be expressed as the inverse function















sd , and so forth.
As a shorthand, deﬁne the argument x ≡ fsd(1)(ϕ/ϕ∗










where the last step follows by the inverse function theorem since zsd(G) strictly increases in G. By
equation (A.1), ~ Gsd = z
−1






< 1 ⇐⇒ ~ G(x) − ~ G
′(x)x > 0. (A.2)
We want to show that, if Restriction 1 holds, exporter scale asd(ϕ) strictly increases in ϕ when





sd , and so forth. So, by (15) and with the shorthand x =
fsd(1)(ϕ/ϕ∗
sd)σ−1, consider
asd(x) = σ xH
( ~ G(x)
)−(σ−1)/ ~ G(x).





sd , and so forth. Since
we are only interested in sufﬁciency of the Restriction and since H(·)−(σ−1) strictly increases at the
evaluation points, it sufﬁces to show that the result is true for x/ ~ G(x). x/ ~ G(x) is differentiable at










~ G(x) − ~ G′(x)x
[ ~ G(x)]2 > 0 ⇐⇒ ~ G(x) − ~ G
′(x)x > 0.
The last step is an implication of Restriction 1 as shown in (A.2). This establishes the result.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3























































































for θ > σ − 1. Using the deﬁnitions of ϕ∗
sd,ϕ
∗,2



















So  Tsd = [~ θσ/(~ θ−1)]fsd(1)
~ θ ∑∞
G=1 fsd(G)−(~ θ−1)h(G)−θ, proving the ﬁrst equality in (19). The
expression is ﬁnite by Assumption 3.





















































38Using the deﬁnition Fsd(Gsd) =
∑Gsd
g=1 fsd(g) and collecting terms with a common ϕ
∗,G
sd we can
rewrite the above expression as


















θ fsd(3) + ... .
Using the deﬁnition of ϕ
∗,G
sd from equation (12) in the above equation we get






























This proves the second equality in (19). So  Fsd/ Tsd is a destination invariant constant.
A.3 Mean sales per product
Figure 1 (Fact 1) depicts average sales of the g-th product for ﬁrms with an exporter scope of
exactly Gsd products in market d. To compute this statistic, we integrate the sales of the g-th
product psdg(ϕ)xsdg(ϕ) over the probability density of ﬁrms with ϕ such that ϕ
∗,G





















































































)−~ [+(− 1)] g−α(σ−1),
where we used the deﬁnition from equation (11) in the last equality.
B Counterfactuals and Calibration
For the counterfactuals we set ws = W β
s P 1−β
s and, introducing auxiliary notation, we replace
fsd(1)  Fsd with W
−(~ θ−1)
d ~ Fsd sinceﬁxedcosts arehomogeneous of degreeonein the import country’s
39wage (and thus fsd(1)  Fsd is homogeneous of degree 1− ~ θ). We denote future variables with a
prime, and we consider technological parameters and labor endowments as time invariant. Using
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(B.4)
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d ~ Fkd, (B.5)






















The ﬁnal equation for our counterfactuals follows Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2010, Ap-
pendix E). We allow the share γd of manufacturing value added in GDP to be country speciﬁc.
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(
  ~ Fdd
) 1/θ .
We consider   ~ Fdd = 1 in our counterfactual exercise, so this expression differs for domestic entry costs from a similar
one in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2009) inasmuch as changes in the ratio   Td/   Wd reﬂect changes in
the ratio of total absorption to wages (which is not one due to non-zero deﬁcits).
40Total manufacturing absorption is








      










d is total GDP of country d, including labor income and proﬁts, DT
d is the current account
deﬁcit and Yd output of the manufacturing sector. Notice that manufacturing spending equals
Td = Yd + Dd, where Dd is the trade deﬁcit in the manufacturing sector. So we can solve for Td





















To summarize, using the Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) algorithm, we can compute how
given changes in the ﬁxed costs   ~ Fkd lead to ^ λsd, ^ Pd, ^ Wd, and the new T ′
d, Y ′
d by inspecting equa-











where we use relationship (B.7) and T ′
d = Y ′
d + Dd.
We obtain individual γd by country. To do so, we solve equation (B.7) for γd and compute
γd =




































where ε > 1, σ > 1,ε ̸= σ.













With this new deﬁnition, the expressions for ﬁrm product sales (9) and for aggregate bilateral
trade (19) in Proposition 3 remain unaltered. Restrictions 1 and 2 take a generalized form but the
expressions are similar. For remaining details on the generalized model see our online Technical
Appendix.
With this generalization, a ﬁrm’s individual products can be less substitutable among them-
selves than with outside products (if ε < σ) or more substitutable (ε > σ). So the introduction
of additional products has a direct effect on the sales of infra-marginal products. The effect is
symmetric for all products, so relative sales of a ﬁrm’s existing products are not affected by the
introduction of additional products. This constancy of relative sales in our model does not carry
over to models with CES-preferences and a countable number of ﬁrms such as Feenstra and Ma




We identify an exporter’s sector from the ﬁrm’s reported CNAE four-digit industry (for 654 in-
dustries across all sectors of the economy) in the administrative RAIS records (Relac ¸˜ ao Anual
de Informac ¸˜ oes Sociais) at the Brazilian labor ministry. The level of detail in CNAE is roughly
comparable to the NAICS 2007 ﬁve-digit level. To map from the HS 6-digit codes to ISIC revi-
sion 2 at the two-digit level we use an extended SITC-to-ISIC concordance, augmenting an OECD
concordance for select manufacturing industries to all industries.38
As Table D.1 shows in columns 5 and 6, our Brazilian manufacturer sample includes 10,215
ﬁrms with shipments of 3,717 manufacturing products at the 6-digit Harmonized System level to
170 destinations, and a total of 162,570 exporter-destination-product observations.39 Exporters
38Our SITC-to-ISIC concordance is available at URL econ.ucsd.edu/muendler/resource.
39We remove export records with zero value from the Brazilian data, which include shipments of commercial
42Table D.1: Sample Characteristics by Destination
From Brazil
to destination (d) USA Argentina OECDa non-OECDa Agg. Worlda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# of Firms (M) 3,083 4,590 5,041 8,664 10,215
# of Destinations (N) 1 1 23 147 170
# of HS-6 products (G) 2,144 2,814 2,772 3,537 3,717
# of Observations 10,775 21,623 36,359 126,211 162,570
Destination share in Tot. exp. .257 .144 .559 .441 1
Firm shares in Total exports
Single-prod. ﬁrms .123 .086 .142 .069 .090
Multi-prod. ﬁrms’ top prod. .662 .555 .625 .573 .597
Multi-prod. ﬁrms’ other prod. .215 .359 .233 .359 .313
Median Total exp. (Td(m)) .120 .068 .137 .066 .089
Median Exp. scope (Gd(m)) 1 2 2 2 2
Median Exp. scale (ad(m)) .068 .031 .070 .028 .037
Mean Total exports ( td) 3.170 1.192 4.217 1.932 3.720
Mean Exp. scope (  Gd) 3.495 4.711 3.933 5.176 5.278
Mean Exp. scale ( ad) .907 .253 1.072 .373 .705
aEach aggregate region (world, OECD, non-OECD) treated as a single destination, collapsing product shipments
to different countries into single product shipment.
Sources: SECEX 2000, manufacturing ﬁrms and their manufactured products.
Note: Products at the HS 6-digit level. Exports in US$ million fob. Firms’ exporter scale ( ad in US$ million fob) is the
scope-weighted arithmetic mean of exporter scales. OECD includes all OECD members in 1990. The United States
is Brazil’s top export destination in 2000, Argentina second to top.
shipping multiple products dominate. They ship more than 90 percent of all exports from Brazil,
and their global top-selling product accounts for 60 percent of Brazilian exports worldwide. A
ﬁrm’s top product, however, is not the same in all destinations. On average, the ﬁrms’ local top-
selling products account for 70 percent of local sales by destination (not reported).
To calculate summary medians and means of these variables for regional aggregates and the
world as a whole in Table D.1 (columns 3 to 6), we treat each aggregate as if it were a single
destination and collapse all product shipments to different countries within the aggregate into a
single product shipment. In most data treatments in the text, in contrast, we analyze these variables
country by country, consistent with our main hypothesis that distribution-side determinants of trade
matter repeatedly destination by destination.
The median exporter is a relatively small exporter, with sales to the rest of the world totalling
samples but also potential reporting errors, and lose 408 of initially 162,978 exporter-destination-product observations.
Our results on exporter scope do not materially change when including or excluding zero-shipment products from the
product count.
43around US$ 89,000. The mean exporter, in contrast, sells around US$ 3.7 million abroad, more
than 40 times as much as the median manufacturer. Exporter scope and exporter scale exhibit sim-
ilarly stark differences between mean and median. The median Brazilian manufacturer sells two
products worldwide, but the mean scope per ﬁrm is 5.3 products. The median Brazilian manufac-
turer has a product scale of around US$ 37,000 per product, but the exporter scale per exporter is
US$ 705,000, or around 20 times as high as that for the median ﬁrm.40
The importance of the top-selling product at multi-product exporters and the mean-median ra-
tios repeat across destinations. To investigate the robustness across countries, we select Brazil’s
top two export destinations (United States and Argentina), as well as the OECD and non-OECD ag-
gregates. Our theory emphasizes the importance of exporting behavior within destinations. Within
single countries, the mean manufacturer’s exports exceed the median manufacturer’s exports by
similarly large factors as in the aggregate, between 14 (in Argentina, column 2) and 26 (in the
United States, column 1). In the OECD aggregate (column 3), exports of the mean ﬁrm exceed the
exports of the median ﬁrm by a factor of about 30. Interestingly, the same mean-median ratio of
about 30 prevails in the non-OECD aggregate.
We further investigate the striking similarity of ﬁrm scope choices across destinations by relat-
ing the mean number of products to market characteristics. For this purpose, we consider a further
decomposition of the left-hand side variable: deﬁne  tsd as the mean sales of ﬁrms from s selling
to d divided by the exporter scale of these ﬁrms in market d. Thus  tsd ≡  Gsd  tsd/  Gsd ≡  Gsd  asd,
where  Gsd is the exporter mean exporter scope and  asd ≡  td/  Gsd is the exporter mean product
scale per product. We regress the log mean exporter scope  Gd on the log of λsdTsd.







The R2 is .281 (standard errors in parentheses). Neither market share nor market size are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant predictors of exporter scope at conventional levels.41 So, most of the variation in
ﬁrms’ exports to a market is due to variation in their mean scale per product.
At the ﬁrm level, the Brazilian data exhibit market-presence patterns broadly similar to the
40The means in Table D.1 are calculated as follows. A source country’s total exports Td are decomposed into
Td = Md  Gd  ad, where Md is the number of exporters to destination d,  Gd ≡
∑Md
ϕ=1 Gd(ϕ)/Md is the exporters’ mean
exporter scope, and  ad ≡  td/  Gd is their products’ exporter scale. Equivalently,  ad is the weighted arithmetic mean




ϕ=1 Gd(ϕ)] =  td/  Gd. As the decomposition
shows, scope weighting is necessary for the mean scope and the exporter scale to yield total exports when multiplied.
41The R2 drops to .212 when including lnMsd and industry ﬁxed effects but coefﬁcients become statistically sig-
niﬁcant at conventional levels except for market size, while magnitudes change little.
44FrenchandU.S.ﬁrm-destinationdata. SimilartoEaton, Kortum, andKramarz(2004), forinstance,
the elasticity of the number of ﬁrms with respect to the number of export destinations is about -2.5,
just as for French exporters.
D.2 Estimation of Figure 1 (Fact 1)
To generate data such as those in Figure 1 (Fact 1), we aggregate individual product sales by
averagingoverallproductsofagivenrankandallﬁrmswithagivenexporterscopeinadestination.
As shown in Appendix A.3, our model implies that the regression equation for average product
sales in Figure 1 is
ln asd = ln θσ
θ−(σ−1)fsd(1) + [δ + α(σ−1)]lnGsd(ϕ) − [α(σ−1)]lng
+ln
[
















sd )−θ − (ϕ
∗,G+1
sd )−θ]dϕ is average
product sales for a product of rank g over all ﬁrms with exporter scope Gsd.
We ﬁt this regression equation with non-linear least squares under three choices of the free pa-
rameter: ~ θ = 1.06 (as used by Luttmer (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) and reported
by Axtell (2001)); ~ θ = 1.28 (our middle-ground benchmark for counterfactual simulations); and
~ θ = 1.49 (as reported by Arkolakis (2010)). We ﬁnd for δ + α(σ−1) estimates of 1.60 and 1.61
under the three parametrizations and for α(σ−1) an estimate of 2.55 under all three parametriza-
tions. These estimates closely resemble those in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the estimate for α(σ−1)
is close to the slopes between 2.6 and 2.8 that were reported in Section 2.2 for Figure 1.
D.3 Data for simulations
For bilateral trade and trade balances in manufacturing products, we use World Trade Flow (WTF)
data in U.S. dollars for the year 2000 (Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo 2005). To mitigate the
effect of entrepˆ ot trade, we follow Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) and collapse (i) Hong Kong,
Mac˜ ao and mainland China, (ii) Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and (iii) Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand into single entities. In 2000, import information for India is
missing from WTF. We obtain information for India in 2000 from UN Comtrade. We keep only
manufactured products from the WTF data, using a concordance from the OECD at the SITC
45revision-2 4-digit level to determine manufactured products. So our ﬁnal bilateral trade data set
excludes agricultural and mining commodities. By our construction, the world’s trade balance in
manufactures is zero.
For information on GDP, manufacturing value added and the overall trade balances in goods
and services in 2000 we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2009 (WDI). India
included, our initial WTF sample has 132 countries that can be matched to the WDI data, and
we collapse bilateral trade for the rest of the world by trade partner into a 133rd observation. We
compute GDP and manufacturing value added for the rest of the world as the WDI reported world
total less the sample total of our 132 matched countries. We set the overall trade balances in goods
and services for the rest of the world so that the world total is zero.
We obtain β from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database at the 3-digit ISIC level (revi-
sion 2), which offers both manufacturing value added and manufacturing gross production for 51
of our sample countries and the rest of the world. Averaging the ratio of manufacturing value added
to manufacturing output in 2000 over these countries yields β = .330. This worldwide β estimate
enters our computation of γd by (B.9).
We ﬁnally need information on manufacturing absorption. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Kra-
marz (2004), we infer manufacturing absorption as manufacturing output (from the UNIDO Indus-
trial Statistics Database 2005) plus the trade deﬁcit (from WTF). The UNIDO data for manufac-
turing output are considerably less complete than either WTF or WDI. We obtain manufacturing
output for Brazil from the Brazilian statistical agency IBGE (2010). Our ﬁnal country sample for
which we have manufacturing absorption contains 57 countries. By the model in Appendix B, γd
is given as (B.9). We use our WTF-WDI-UNIDO data to calculate γd by country. For the rest of
the world, we set γd to the sample average over our 57 countries (average γ = .244) and back out
manufacturing absorption for the rest of the world from (B.9).
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